sábado, 26 de noviembre de 2011

Mancha de Petróleo en Frade - (by John Lyons)


SAO PAULO—Un derrame de petróleo en un pozo de aguas profundas de Chevron Corp. frente a la costa de Rio de Janeiro este mes ha provocado la furia local e investigaciones de la compañía estadounidense. También se ha convertido en un incomodo recordatorio de que el esfuerzo de Brasil por conseguir la prosperidad a través del petróleo puede ser más costoso —y más complicado— de lo que muchos esperaban.
El escape a comienzos de noviembre en el yacimiento petrolífero de Frade, fue detenido tras la fuga de 2.400 barriles de crudo al mar, una fracción de los aproximadamente 4,9 millones de barriles derramados en el Golfo de México el año pasado cuando estalló la plataforma Deepwater Horizon en un pozo de BP PLC. En el caso de Brasil, no es probable que la mancha de petróleo llegue a las playas, dicen funcionarios locales, y ésta ya se está disipando de la superficie oceánica.
European Pressphoto Agency
Pero las consecuencias para Chevron no se están moderando. Las autoridades brasileñas suspendieron todas las operaciones de Chevron en Brasil esta semana, y organismos locales están pugnando por cobrar multas. La cifra ronda los US$80 millones por el momento pero podría aumentar. La Policía Federal de Brasil considera el derrame una posible escena de delito, y el ministro de Medio Ambiente de Rio de Janeiro, Carlos Minc, ha insinuado que Chevron podría ser expulsada de Brasil.
La compañía dijo el viernes que considera la suspensión de sus actividades de perforación en Brasil un "juicio prematuro" y dijo que mantendrá su programa de inversión de US$3.000 millones en el país.
Chevron planea defenderse demostrando que usó todos los recursos posibles para detener el derrame en cuatro días, dijo Ali Moshiri, presidente de Exploración y Producción de Chevron en África y América Latina.
"Confiamos con seguir trabajando estrechamente con la Agencia Nacional del Petróleo y el Ministerio de Minas y Energía para resolver toda preocupación", dijo. La compañía ya ha recibido "firme apoyo" de autoridades del estado de Rio de Janeiro para ayudar a resolver el problema, dijo Moshiri.
El director de operaciones de Chevron en Brasil, George Buck, compareció en una audiencia legislativa esta semana para recalcar el deseo de la compañía de permanecer en Brasil. Por medio de un intérprete, Buck ofreció a los legisladores "sinceras disculpas al pueblo brasileño y al gobierno brasileño".
El regulador petrolero de Brasil ha acusado a Chevron de negligencia y de no brindar información acerca del derrame a las autoridades. Chevron debe cesar el trabajo en Brasil hasta que se complete una investigación. En su testimonio, Buck dijo que Chevron actuó con rapidez y transparencia. Chevron, que opera el yacimiento de US$3.000 millones junto con los socios minoritarios Petróleo Brasileiro SA, o Petrobras, y Frade Japão Petróleo, dice que el aumento marcado en la presión del yacimiento causó el derrame.
El derrame de Chevron está creando inquietud aquí como la primera señal del lado oscuro del descubrimiento por Brasil en 2006 de las mayores reservas marítimas del hemisferio en décadas. Ha reorientado la atención brasileña a la explotación marítima de crudo.
Hasta ahora, el único debate público sobre el plan de Brasil de convertirse en uno de los mayores productores petroleros en décadas se ha centrado en cómo gastar las ganancias inesperadas por la serie de grandes hallazgos frente a las costas de de Rio.
El mayor descubrimiento, el yacimiento Lula, al sur del de Frade, contiene unos 6.500 millones de barriles de crudo. El yacimiento fue bautizado con el nombre del ex presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, quien completó su mandato en enero y calificó la riqueza petrolera de Brasil de una oportunidad para erradicar la pobreza, mejorar la educación y financiar sectores generadores de empleos.
"El problema es que el proceso ha sido completamente politizado, al decir que va a resolver todos los problemas sociales de Brasil. La verdad es que sacar petróleo de las profundidades no será tan barato o tan fácil como ha hecho creer el gobierno", dijo Adriano Pires, quien dirige el Centro Brasileño de Infraestructura, una firma de consultoría de energía.
El crudo es el núcleo de un esfuerzo amplio para impulsar el crecimiento a través del desarrollo de vastos recursos naturales. La controversia por los costos ambientales y otros, podría crecer a medida que estos planes se hagan realidad. Este mes, el Congreso brasileño está debatiendo un plan para diluir los códigos ambientales para los negocios agroindustriales brasileños. Mientras tanto, en la amazonía, grupos indígenas protestan los planes de construir decenas de plantas hidroeléctricas en sus ríos.
Ciertamente, Brasil no es ajeno a accidentes petroleros. En 2001, la que entonces era la mayor plataforma petrolera del mundo se hundió frente a las costas de Río, coronando una mala racha para la petrolera estatal Petrobras que incluyó el derrame de 1,29 millones de litros en una de las bahías de Río y el doble de esa cantidad en un río en el sur del país, en accidentes sucesivos.
Pero los pozos de aguas profundas de Brasil desde 2006 representan un nuevo nivel de complejidad. La mayoría del petróleo recientemente descubierto está a varios kilómetros de profundidad bajo el lecho marino, piedra y una gruesa capa movediza de sal que representa una frontera relativamente nueva en la exploración oceánica, por cuanto rara vez se han hecho perforaciones a través de esa capa en la industria.
En el momento del derrame del yacimiento de Frade, Chevron buscaba petróleo a una profundidad de 1.160 metros, menos hondo que el nivel llamado subsalino. Chevron integra un pequeño grupo de compañías con licencias para buscar petróleo subsalino en Brasil y había pedido permiso para buscar petróleo en niveles subsalinos debajo del yacimiento de Frade.
Diana Kinch contribuyó a este artículo.

Campo de Frade - Vazamento



A mancha de óleo resultante do vazamento ocorrido no Campo de Frade, na Bacia de Campos, litoral norte fluminense, continua diminuindo e se afastando do litoral. A informação foi dada pelos órgãos federais que compõem o grupo de acompanhamento do acidente, com base na observação feita no sobrevoo realizado ontem (24) por um helicóptero da Marinha, com técnicos da Agência Nacional do Petróleo, Gás Natural e Biocombustíveis (ANP).
 

Segundo nota divulgada hoje (25) pelo grupo, com base na observação visual, calcula-se que a mancha esteja com 3,8 quilômetros (km) de extensão e cerca de 1 quilômetro quadrado (km²) de área. No dia 21, a mancha era de cerca de 2 km².
 

Ainda é possível, no entanto, notar o afloramento de óleo na superfície. Técnicos que acompanham o caso alertam que outras manchas podem aflorar, sem que isso represente, necessariamente, novo vazamento. Isso decorre do fato de o vazamento ter ocorrido a grande profundidade, o que faz o óleo levar tempo considerável para chegar do fundo do mar até a superfície, explicam os técnicos.

Segundo o Instituto Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente e Recursos Naturais Renováveis (Ibama), um dos órgãos federais que compõem o grupo de acompanhamento, não foi recebida, até agora, nenhuma comunicação sobre problemas com a fauna causados pelo óleo.
 

A Marinha do Brasil coletou amostras do óleo proveniente do vazamento para análise, com o propósito de identificar sua composição química.
 

O grupo de acompanhamento, formado pela ANP, Ibama e Marinha, continua monitorando as medidas que vem sendo tomadas pela empresa petroleira Chevron Brasil para conter o vazamento de óleo no poço que explora no Campo de Frade, e amenizar as consequências do incidente.

sábado, 12 de noviembre de 2011

Swedish and Chinese Investment in Brazil



Brazil is cashing in on its natural gas resources with new international deals that secure both early development of existing finds and new investors for the industry.

Swedish group Skanska this week announced a $490 million engineering, procurement and construction contract to build a new 550 megawatt natural gas thermal power plant in Rio de Janeiro. It is Skanska's biggest contract in Latin America.

A larger deal finalized Friday will see Chinese energy giant Sinopec paying $3.54 billion for Portuguese company Galp's 30 percent stake in a deep-sea asset in Brazil's Santos Basin in the South Atlantic, about 190 miles southeast of Sao Paulo.

The Skanska contract with Brazilian energy group Petrobras aims to push forward a gas-powered thermal power generation project in Seropedica at Baixada Fluminense, about 45 miles north of Rio de Janeiro.
Skanska, the single contractor of the project, will do the basic design, detailed engineering and construction of the facilities.

The contract includes the procurement of equipment and material and Skanska will assist with the start-up and operation of the plant by the end of 2014. At its peak the plant will have about 1,500 people on the job.

Skanska has been building its business on the continent, focusing on construction, operations and services for the international oil and gas and energy industry. Last year it had about 10,000 employees in the region, one-fifth of an estimated 52,000 Skanska workers worldwide. The company has headquarters in Stockholm, Sweden.

The other energy deal announced Friday gives Galp cash needed to continue expanding operations in Brazil's energy sector, where the sheer size of the required investment and project scale has kept many players out of the picture. Brazil's deep-water reserves require special skills and equipment not used elsewhere and drilling to great depths under the sea bed.

Sinopec's wholly owned unit, Sinopec International Exploration and Production Corp., will take new shares to be issued by Galp and assume shareholder loans, Sinopec said in a statement.

The immediate investment and future capital expenditure could exceed $5 billion, it said.
Sinopec expect to receive 21,300 barrels of oil equivalent per day by 2015, the production set to reach 112,500 boe per day by 2024.

The Sinopec deal means a major entrance for China in Brazil. Last year Sinopec paid Spanish energy group Repsol $7 billion for a 40 percent stake in its Brazilian operations.

China this year has spent more than $37 billion on buying foreign assets, still less than $54 billion it lavished on acquisitions in 2010 but with seven weeks to go before the end of the year


viernes, 28 de octubre de 2011

Interesting article about Oil Prices (by Alex Planes)


As the world urbanizes, demand for oil could outstrip many nations' abilities to get it out of the ground. Most new discoveries have been made in difficult territory, where the costs of extraction dwarf inexpensive Middle Eastern crude. Consumers may have to get used to high prices at the pump, with or without the threat of conflict between two of the world's largest producers. There's risk for some, but great opportunity for many, so read on to discover what's happening and who's poised to strike a gusher as oil prices continue to rise.
Hanging in the balance
Saudi Arabia is the world's most prolific oil-producing state, pumping 10.5 million barrels out of the sand every day last year. That figure has been stable for several years, but the Saudi people have actually been using more oil themselves, leading to stagnant to declining production surpluses.
anImage
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration and author's calculations.
These are five of the world's six largest oil producing countries -- Russia is the other, holding steady with about 7 million barrels per day in surplus -- but none of the largest net exporters have substantially improved their balance in the past five years. New and expanded fields in Canada, the United States, Brazil, and other Latin American nations can inject more black gold into the world's veins, but it's unlikely that any can supplant the Saudis in terms of total output. If Saudi output were to decline, it could have dangerous consequences for global oil supplies. Even if Saudi output remains at the same level, it could be a big problem down the road as oil demand keeps increasing.
Fields of black gold
The crown jewel of Saudi oil production is the Ghawar field. The Saudi kingdom closely guards information on Ghawar, but many estimates place the super field's production in the range of 5 million barrels per day, roughly half the country's total output. Ghawar alone produces about as much oil as the nations of India, Oman, Colombia, Argentina, Malaysia, Egypt, and Australia together. It's also been at the epicenter of the peak oil debate for years, as research has uncovered increasing difficulty in getting oil out of Ghawar. Other Saudi fields have also been facing the same issues.
This is important because worldwide oil use has been growing steadily over the past 30 years without a commensurate increase in major new oil field discoveries. The Bakken shale formation, which became an exciting play because of new oil recovery technologies, only produces a tenth as much oil as Ghawar, and does so with greater difficulty. The Canadian oil sands produce about a fifth as much oil as Ghawar.
The harder it comes, the higher it costs
A major problem with most new oil fields is that extraction costs are much higher than they are in fields like Ghawar. Even cheap, easily accessible oil in other places is quite a bit more expensive to get out of the ground than Saudi oil. It's good to have a monopoly, as long as you can keep it running.
anImage
Source: News reports and government agency estimations.
The more the world relies on unconventional oil extraction, the less likely it is to ever see cheap oil again. The last substantial drop in prices came when everything else was crashing in 2008. Demand retreated in the midst of economic carnage, but it's a lot easier to manage reduced need than it is to cope with a need that simply can't be met.
Rise of the West
Cheap, easy oil is gone, but demand isn't going to go away. Alternative energy could become increasingly important, but it hasn't reached the point of fueling our transport system yet. Promising new oil fields are the best bet for the medium term and could offer substantial gains as production ramps up while the price of oil continues to appreciate. A number of major new oil projects (that we can invest in, anyway) have been in the Western Hemisphere, and many offer the promise of greater expansion. The Bakken shale area, for example, is hitting a wall not because of extraction difficulties, but because the transportation infrastructure isn't big enough.
Offshore discoveries are a bonanza for Brazil's Petroleo Brasiliero (NYSE: PBR  ) , and for Seadrill (NYSE: SDRL  ) , which is constructing several Brazilian deepwater rigs. ATP Oil and Gas (Nasdaq: ATPG  ) also has numerous offshore operations, though the vast majority are in the Gulf of Mexico. Despite its solid presence, much of ATP's reserves remain undeveloped, so there's still opportunity for growth beyond the expectation of higher oil prices.
Canada's Athabasca oil sands have seen heavy development investment from Suncor Energy (NYSE: SU  ) , and Penn West Petroleum (NYSE: PWE  ) has fields in the Peace River sands. As a master limited partnership, Penn West offers higher yields than most and could be a good play for dividend-hungry energy investors. U.S. petroleum producers are varied, but one lesser-known company with the potential to perform is Samson Oil and Gas(AMEX: SSN  ) , which has two Bakken-area holdings it has yet to fully develop. Another option might be SandRidge Energy (NYSE: SD  ) , which operates in "easier" areas like Texas and the Midwest, and has been investing heavily in the infrastructure needed to ramp up its oil production.
If you'd like the inside scoop on some other excellent oil companies, check out The Motley Fool's analysis of three poised to profit from $100 oil. Find out more about them in this free special report before the rest of the world catches on.

sábado, 22 de octubre de 2011

Belo Monte (ENS)

BRASILIA, Brazil, October 19, 2011 (ENS) - A federal judge in Brazil has ruled that the environmental licensing of the Belo Monte hydroelectric dam on the Xingu River in the Amazon is illegal due to the lack of consultation with affected indigenous peoples.

In Monday's court hearing, Federal Regional Appeals Court Judge Selene Maria de Almeida rejected arguments by Brazilian government lawyers that because the Belo Monte dam infrastructure and reservoirs would not be physically located on indigenous lands, there was no need for consultations with indigenous peoples.
Artist's rendition of the Belo Monte dam (Image from promotional video created by Electrobras)
Citing evidence from official sources and independent researchers, the judge concluded that the diversion of 80 percent of the Xingu River into artificial channels and three reservoirs would have devastating impacts downriver for the Arara, Juruna and Xikrin Kayapo indigenous peoples. There would be inevitable losses to the tribes' ability to catch fish, raise crops, and navigate freely, she said.
The vote is the first step in a federal circuit court decision in a lawsuit filed in 2006 by the Federal Public Prosecutors' Office that could ultimately bring the case before Brazil's Supreme Court. If Judge Almeida's decision is upheld by the high court, the Belo Monte dam project will be suspended immediately.
If it is ever built, the 11,000-megawatt dam in the state of Para would be the third largest in the world after China's Three Gorges dam and the Itaipu dam on the Brazil-Paraguay border.
In her decision, Judge Almeida agreed with public prosecutors that the 2005 legislative decree authorizing construction of the Belo Monte dam is illegal because a consultation process with threatened indigenous communities - guaranteed under Article 231 of the Brazilian Constitution - was not first carried out by Congress.
Judge Selene Maria de Almeida (Photo courtesy Dicas de Brasilia)
Judge Almeida ruled that Brazil's Congress has a special responsibility to weigh the benefits of a development project such as Belo Monte against its negative consequences for indigenous peoples.
"The initial decision by Judge Almeida was a good start," said Federal Prosecutor Felicio Pontes, co-author of the lawsuit. "She recognized that the licensing process of Belo Monte is invalid and that indigenous communities were not effectively consulted, despite the fact the project will have devastating impacts on their lands and livelihoods. Now it is important the judgment be reinitiated as quickly as possible."
In her ruling, Judge Almeida cites the need for Brazil to comply with its commitment to the International Labour Organisation's Convention 169, a treaty that requires free, prior and informed consent among indigenous peoples regarding projects that affect their territories and livelihoods.
Judge Almeida concluded that the Brazilian Congress should have based its authorization of the Belo Monte dam on the conclusions of the project's environmental impact assessment, including anthropological studies on its consequences for indigenous peoples.
Following Judge Almeida's vote, another judge, Judge Sebastiao Fagundes de Deus, interrupted the court hearing, requesting more time to examine the lawsuit's documentation.
Sheyla Juruna (Photo courtesyAmazon Watch)
Critics of the dam believe the request by Judge Fagundes de Deus, a conservative who previously worked as a lawyer with the state-run energy company Eletronorte, may be seeking to transform the Belo Monte dam project into a done deal.
It is likely that the final judicial vote on this lawsuit will be taken within weeks.
"I see this as a partial victory," said Sheyla Juruna, a leader of one of the indigenous communities threatened by the Belo Monte dam. "Now more than ever we need to pressure the government."
"What I fear most," said Juruna, who is touring the United States pleading the cause of her people, "is that the next judgment will allow the government to avoid compliance with its highest laws that guarantee us our right to prior and informed consent. The final decision of this lawsuit will show to the Brazilian and international public whether the Brazilian government truly respects indigenous rights or not."
Red dot marks the location of the Belo Monte dam siteon the Xingu River (Map courtesy Wikipedia)
The Belo Monte dam has reached this stage after a series of contentious stops and starts. Plans for the dam began in 1975 but were halted by controversy; they were later revitalized in the late 1990s.
The Norte Energia consortium won the rights to build and operate Belo Monte in an auction held in April 2010.
The consortium is controlled by the state-owned power company Eletrobras, which directly (15%) and through its subsidiaries Eletronorte (19.98%) and CHESF (15%) controls a 49.98% stake in the consortium. In July 2010, Eletrobras listed 18 partners in the consortium.
The dam complex is expected to cost upwards of US$16 billion and the transmission lines another $2.5 billion, funded largely by the Brazilian Development Bank.
On August 26, 2010, a contract was signed with Norte Energia to construct the dam once the Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources, IBAMA, issued an installation license. Under pressure to grant a full installation license, IBAMA President Abelardo Bayma Azevedo resigned in January 2011. A partial license was granted days later on January 26, 2011.
One of many public protests against the Belo Monte hydroelectric dam, August 19, 2011 (Photo courtesy Survival International)
On February 25, the Federal Public Prosecutor filed its 11th lawsuit against the dam, suspending IBAMA's partial installation license, on the grounds that the Brazilian Constitution does not allow for the granting of partial project licenses. The prosecutor also argued that the 40 social and environmental conditions tied to IBAMA's provisional license of February 2010 had yet to be fulfilled, a prerequisite to the granting of a full installation license.
On March 3, that decision was overturned by a higher court, which allowed preliminary construction to begin.
A license to construct the dam was issued on June 1, 2011 but construction was again blocked by a federal judge on September 27 when Judge Carlos Castro Martins ruled in favor of fisheries groups and placed limits on dam construction.
Judge Martins' decision bars the Norte Energia consortium from "building a port, using explosives, installing dikes, building canals and any other infrastructure work that would interfere with the natural flow of the Xingu River, thereby affecting local fish stocks."
Also on September 27, the mayor's office of Altamira, a former supporter of the dam, requested that the national government headed by President Dilma Rousseff suspend the project until her government can meet its guarantee to mitigate the social and environmental impacts.
In addition to the dam's impact on fisherfolk's livelihoods, Judge Martins cited the harm the dam could cause to the region's indigenous peoples, for whom local fish are a staple food.
According to the nonprofit Survival International, the Kayapo tribe has warned that if the dam is built, the Xingu could become a "river of blood."

sábado, 8 de octubre de 2011

Brasil - Industria Naval y Petróleo (por Mario Osava)






BRASIL: Petróleo submarino recupera industria naval

Por Mario Osava


La perspectiva de duplicar la producción actual de 2,1 millones de barriles diarios en el correr de esta década, cuando comiencen a explotarse los yacimientos de la llamada capa "presal" del subsuelo oceánico, sirvió de fundamental incentivo para el crecimiento de la actividad de puertos y astilleros.

Brasil tenía en los años 70 "la segunda mayor industria naval del mundo", pero sufrió luego una merma importante que solo logró revertir en parte en la última década, indicó Sergio Leal, secretario ejecutivo del Sindicato Nacional de la Industria de Construcción Naval (Sinaval).

Los 56.368 empleos directos en el sector registrados en junio superan con creces el mejor nivel del pasado. Los datos no incluyen cerca de 28.000 trabajadores de la industria náutica de pequeñas embarcaciones para esparcimiento.

Pero los observadores hacen hincapié en que los empleos indirectos son muy numerosos, ya que la cadena productiva es muy extensa. Una plataforma petrolera para producción en el océano se compone de miles de rubros y lleva más de un año solo su construcción.

En la carpeta de proyectos de plataformas "ya volvimos al segundo lugar" en el mundo, celebró Leal en el Congreso Internacional Presal Brasil, que reunió a empresarios, autoridades y técnicos del lunes 24 al miércoles 26 en Rio de Janeiro.

El hecho de tener la mayor parte de sus reservas en aguas oceánicas profundas encarece la exploración y producción de petróleo y gas natural en Brasil, porque exige una amplia y costosa infraestructura, además de avances tecnológicos como los que le dieron el liderazgo internacional a la firma estatal Petrobrás.

Con el hallazgo de un inmenso yacimiento en la capa presal, sus reservas de hidrocarburos pueden quintuplicarse. Este país, que hasta ahora luchaba por asegurar su autosuficiencia, podrá convertirse entonces en exportador neto.

Pero esa riqueza está a casi 7.000 metros de profundidad y a más de 300 kilómetros de la costa mar adentro. El desafío de explotarla, con una política que favorece la producción nacional de los medios necesarios, impulsó la industria naval y su extensión denominada "offshore".

Esa política viene de antes. En 2003, el gobierno creó el Programa de Movilización de la Industria Nacional de Petróleo y Gas Natural, para fortalecer la cadena productiva del sector en territorio nacional.

El año siguiente la empresa Transpetro, subsidiaria de Petrobrás para el transporte, anunció el programa de expansión de su flota con 49 nuevos navíos petroleros, con un mínimo de 65 por ciento de componentes nacionales, índice elevado a 70 por ciento en la segunda fase iniciada en 2008, e inversiones totales por 4.600 millones de dólares.

El contenido local se impuso como regla general a partir de 2005 gracias a una resolución de la Agencia Nacional de Petróleo, el organismo regulador.

La industria naval brasileña, que estaba concentrada en Rio de Janeiro en el pasado, ganó nuevos polos.

El nordestito Puerto de Suape encabeza hoy el sector en toneladas de porte bruto (TPB), con un gran astillero instalado últimamente y que ya construye muchos navíos petroleros, aunque Rio de Janeiro ofrezca el doble de empleos en una producción más diversificada, explicó Leal.

En el extremo sur del país florece otro polo. Con dos astilleros operando y otros dos en construcción cerca de su principal puerto marítimo, el estado de Rio Grande do Sul tiene excelentes condiciones para aprovechar la oportunidad generada por el petróleo presal, según Vanderlan Vasconcelos, titular de la Superintendencia de Puertos e Hidrovías del distrito.

El estado ofrece una industria metalmecánica ya desarrollada, con 2.100 empresas, 167 del sector electrónico y 300 firmas geoceánicas, la mayoría servida por una hidrovía de 758 kilómetros que permite estrecha la conexión con el puerto Rio Grande y los astilleros, detalló.

Además, las lagunas y ríos locales pueden constituir una nueva red fluvial en el Mercosur (Mercado Común del Sur), con 1.530 kilómetros de extensión, contribuyendo a integrar las economías de Brasil, Argentina y Uruguay, que integran el bloque junto a Paraguay, acotó.

Otra ventaja del puerto de Rio Grande es la relativa proximidad con Sudáfrica y Asia, corroboró Wilen Manteli, presidente de la Asociación Brasileña de Terminales Portuarios, en contraposición a Suape, que está más en línea con Europa y Estados Unidos.

"El ciclo del presal durará 30 años como mínimo", estimó Aloisio Nóbrega, vicepresidente de la Agencia Gaucha de Desarrollo y Promoción de Inversiones. Por eso, una de las prioridades del gobierno de Rio Grande do Sul es la "industria oceánica", como él prefiere denominar a "offshore".

Esa industria no se limita a los astilleros, sino que integra una larga cadena que será beneficiada por el hecho de que este meridional estado cuenta con el segundo mayor parque industrial metalmecánico de Brasil, solo superado por São Paulo, arguyó. Añadió a ello la mejor calidad de vida en esta zona y un mercado de 11 millones de habitantes.

El campo de los hidrocarburos del presal oceánico, lejos de la costa sudeste de Brasil y extendiéndose por 800 kilómetros de largo y 200 de ancho, "necesita embarcaciones nuevas y mas eficientes", además de "instalaciones específicas" para atender sus actividades, aseguró Fernando Fialho, director general de la Agencia Nacional de Transportes Acuaviarios (Antaq).

A pesar de la multiplicación de puertos y astilleros, en Brasil aún urge un mayor esfuerzo y premura, porque los proyectos de infraestructura demandan mucho tiempo debido a la necesidad de sacar licencias ambientales y tener contratos e "ingeniería financiera" a largo plazo, alertó.

La capacitación masiva de mano de obra es otro desafío, acotó Fialho.

"El escenario futuro exige esfuerzos alternativos" y las hidrovías constituyen una prioridad de Antaq, porque llevan el desarrollo al interior del país y "la industria que sirve al presal no necesariamente tiene que estar en la costa", concluyó.(FIN/2011)



PETROLEO INTERNACIONAL (Agosto-12, 2009)

Costa afuera

BRASIL
¿Qué pasará con el presal brasileño?
Se estima que de cada tres pozos perforados, uno tiene reservas 

Equipo editorial Petróleo Internacional, Agosto 2009 
En días recientes, Petrobras divulgó un comunicado al mercado informando haber perforado 30 pozos en el área del presal, con un índice de éxito de 87%. En la Cuenca de Santos los éxitos hasta ahora son de 100%. Informaciones preliminares obtenidas por el gobierno en la ANP indican que Petrobras y las operadoras privadas han perforado en total 34 pozos en la capa del presal. De estos, según la fuente del gobierno, 31 pozos (cerca de 91%) mostraron la existencia de petróleo en condiciones viables de producción.
La caída del índice de éxito de la perforación de pozos exploratorios en la región del pre-sal brasileño es una tendencia natural. A la larga debe llegar a 30%, el mismo promedio de la Cuenca de Campos, lo dicen tres geólogos y un consultor especialista en el pre-sal. “Hablar de un índice de éxitos de 100% con riesgo cero, es casi dar una licencia poética”, afirmó el exdirector de la Agencia Nacional do Petróleo (ANP), John Foreman.
En días recientes, Petrobras divulgó un comunicado al mercado informando haber perforado 30 pozos en el área del pre-sal, con un índice de éxito del 87%. En la Cuenca de Santos los éxitos hasta ahora son del 100%. Informaciones preliminares obtenidas por el gobierno en la ANP indican que Petrobras y las operadoras privadas han perforado en total 34 pozos en la capa del pre-sal. De estos, según la fuente del gobierno, 31 pozos (cerca de 91%) mostraron la existencia de petróleo en condiciones viables de producción.
La nota fue divulgada en respuesta a un reportaje del periódico Valor Económico indicando que 32% de los pozos en el pre-sal tuvieron resultados no satisfactorios. Con base en datos de la ANP, el periódico presentó una lista de 28 pozos, de los cuales 9 serían secos o subcomerciales.
“La tendencia es que el índice de éxitos en el pre-sal baje. Sería excelente si terminara en 30%”, afirma el geólogo Guiseppe Baccocoli. Él recuerda que al realizar la primera perforación en un área para identificar reservas potenciales, el principal objetivo es donde hay los indicios más fuertes de petróleo, indicador por un levantamiento sísmico. “En las otras perforaciones, se busca delimitar el yacimiento. El trabajo se desplaza hacia los lados para probar áreas con menos certeza y es natural que disminuya la tasa de éxito”.
Para el geólogo Marcio Mello de HRT Petroleum, las estructuras del pre-sal son gigantescas y merecen el calificativo de “billete premiado de lotería”, aunque no se mantenga el riesgo cero. “El índice de éxito que vamos a encontrar en el pre-sal – y que el tiempo lo demostrará – será el mismo que existe en la Cuenca de Campos, o sea que de cada tres pozos perforados, uno encuentra reservas. Es un nivel alto para un área que promete un volumen elevado”, destacó.
En la Cuenca de Santos, que es la referencia para el pre-sal, 15 pozos perforados justifican la euforia del gobierno. Hasta la perforación del décimo quinto pozo, el segundo en el área del bloque CM-S-22, operado por la Exxon en sociedad con Petrobras, todos habían registrado presencia de petróleo o gas. En junio pasado, cuando la Exxon confirmó el primer pozo seco, el mercado comenzó a cuestionar el potencial de esa área, en la que ya se habían identificado hasta 12.000 millones de barriles (entre Tupi e Iara), con un potencial todavía mayor.
El propio ministro de Minas y Energía de Brasil, Edison Lobão, quien dijo que sólo volverá a pronunciarse al respecto después de que la ANP concluya el nuevo análisis de los pozos, llegó a referirse al área del pre-sal en toda su extensión geológica (800 km de largo por 200 km de ancho) con potencial de hasta 150 mil millones de barriles.
“Se ha dicho mucho sobre el índice de éxito en el pre-sal. Inicialmente hablaban de una gran laguna de petróleo que se extendía por toda esa área con un volumen de 160 mil km2. Después, que esa formación rocosa tendría algunas acumulaciones a lo largo de toda su extensión. Hoy, por los estudios disponibles, se sabe que las mayores acumulaciones del pre-sal están en el Polo de Tupi. Poco a poco estamos aprendiendo más sobre esta nueva frontera geológica”, comentó un ejecutivo del sector, que pidió no ser identificado.
El promedio mundial de éxito de perforación es hoy de 10% a 12%, con picos máximos de 25 e 30%, según especialistas del sector. En tanto que para áreas nuevas, nunca antes exploradas, como es el caso del pre-sal brasileño, sería razonable un indicador de 5%.
Según el director ejecutivo de DCT Energia, Ericson de Paula, la actividad de exploración se realiza por aproximación y error. “Cuanto más perfora una empresa operadora, más aumenta la precisión de la exploración y la perforación de pozos secos termina siendo una consecuencia. La perforación de pozos secos no es necesariamente mala. Es parte del proceso”.
Este especialista agrega que como no hay antecedentes históricos para el área del pre-sal, no es posible calcular cuál sería un índice razonable de éxito para el área. El que las empresas perforen pozos que resultan secos durante su evaluación no va a disminuir el apetito de las empresas operadoras privadas por el pre-sal, “porque no existen muchas nuevas fronteras que explorar y, entre las disponibles, el Brasil es el mercado con las reglas más estables.

miércoles, 28 de septiembre de 2011

Presal - Brazilian Chamber of Deputies (Presalt)

Written by F. Jimenez - (Translator)
Source: Brazilian Chamber of Deputies

 The current findings from Petrobras and other companies in the province of the Pre-salt, located in the Brazilian continental shelf, can mean reserves of over 50 billion barrels of oil, a volume four times greater than the current national reserves, roughly 14 billion barrels. In this province, there may be large oil and natural gas reserves located under salt layers that extend for 800 kilometers along the Brazilian coast – from the state of Santa Catarina coast to the coast of Espirito Santo – up to 200 km wide. Some estimates give the total area of the Pre-salt as 122,000 km2. Of this total, concessions have already been granted for 41,000 km2 and 71,000 km2 have not yet been tendered. Pre-salt oil is of good quality, although it is found in reserves that are in deep-sea areas and under thick layers of salt, requiring large-scale investment to extract it. Since 2006, Petrobras has sunk 11 oil wells in the Santos Basin. All these oil wells have been successful, i.e., the success rate was 100%. At the prospects of Tupi and Iara alone, which are located in the BM-S-11 block, Petrobras already estimates that there are 8 to 12 billion barrels of recoverable oil. This block alone can almost double the current Brazilian reserves.

 EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION MODEL Basic Choices Governments have two basic choices to further oil and natural gas exploration: 1)creating a state-owned company to carry out research and production, as in Mexico, Saudi Arabia, and Oman; 2) Entering into contracts with state-owned or private companies, as in Brazil, the UK, and Canada. It is also possible to mix the two systems, as in Kazakhstan and Nigeria. Contract types The contract types (concession, production sharing, joint venture or services) vary greatly in terms of how profits are split and costs dealt with. By and large, the high level of uncertainty about potential reserves, costs of production, and future prices of oil tends to affect the negotiations. Each contract type has its advantages and disadvantages, which will be analyzed below.

It is important to observe that in the model of production sharing the state can get the bulk of the production without running any risk (Bindemann, 1999). 1 Concession The concession contracts assure sole rights for research, production, and the sales of oil extracted from a certain area in a certain period of time. Companies compete for the areas by offering bonuses to the government. In the concession model, if commercial production occurs, payment, usually called “royalties,” will be made to the State as established in the contract. This payment can be based on gross or net sales. All development risks, including the exploration costs, are the responsibility of the successful bidder. The main disadvantage of this type of contract is commercial. Ordinarily, there is a lack of adequate knowledge concerning the potential for an area to be developed, since the seismic exploration tends to be partial. If the knowledge of the area is incomplete, the government runs the risk of not realizing the best possible profit. 2 Production sharing In the production sharing model, the State maintains the ownership of the oil and negotiates a system for profit distribution. Unless otherwise agreed, governments will receive profits without having to make any investment because the government usually has the cost of its initial contribution paid by the companies. This cost is reimbursed to them from the government’s future profits. Although the oil belongs to the State, the companies take the risks. However, the State also can take risks, by allowing part of its profit to be used to develop the area. Nevertheless, the companies are entitled to recover their investment, operation and maintenance costs. In general, the investment costs are recovered along a certain number of years, and the operation and maintenance costs in the same year they are incurred. The complexity of a production-sharing contract depends on the country’s legal framework. If the country has established the basic contract rules in law, contracts are simpler, since most of the content is already covered by the law. If the terms of a production-sharing contract are set by law, this offers more safety to companies. This is what happened in Azerbaijan and other ex-Soviet Republics. However, it makes the contract rather inflexible because only the Parliament can change it. 3 Joint ventures In contrast to what happens in the case of concession and production-sharing contracts, there is no internationally established definition of those contracts termed joint ventures. A joint venture contract merely establishes that two or more parties wish to create a clearly established “union”. Joint ventures, due to their “open” character, are less common than concession and production-sharing contracts. The main characteristic of joint ventures is that the costs, and usually the risks, are shared. As risks and costs are shared, the government has a direct responsibility over the exploration of oil and natural gas, and becomes a potential agent of damages, including environmental ones. 4 Services There are two types of service contracts: a provision of service one and a risk service one. In the case of a provision of service contract, the companies are paid to explore a field, but all oil produced belongs to the State. In the case of a risk service contract, the company undertakes all the investment and is afterwards reimbursed by the production of the field. The company may receive either money or oil for the services provided, as set out in the contract. At present, service contracts are very rarely used. Risks and rewards Risks and rewards from the main contract types used in the oil industry are very different, as Table 1 shows:

Table 1 – Risks and rewards. Contract Company Government Situation in which it usually exists in Concession All risks and high reward Reward is function of production and price Countries with a low relationship between reserves and consumption, and high exploration risks Production sharing Exploration risk and part of production risk No risk and part of production Countries with large reserves and low exploration risks, e.g. Brazil after pre-salt discoveries Provision of service contract No risk All risks Countries with large reserves, low exploration risks, and very low production costs Joint ventures Participation in the risks and in the production Participation in the risks and in the production Norway adopts, in strategic areas, contracts similar to joint ventures It is important to note that many countries adopt mixed models.

 Table 2 shows the contract types used in various countries (Azevedo, 2008) Table 2 –

Contract types in various countries. CONTRACT TYPES COUNTIES • Licenses • Norway • UK • Production-Sharing Contracts • Angola • Bolivia • Colombia • Ecuador • India • Libya • Mozambique • Nigeria • Pakistan • Senegal • Tanzania • Turkey • Venezuela • China • Malaysia • Employment Contract • Concession Contracts • Argentina • USA • Peru • Portugal • BRAZIL • Service Contracts • Risk Contracts • Iran • Mexico • Contracts Without Risks (Reimbursement and Payment in Currency Any country makes use of this type. ???


 PETROBRAS AND THE PRE-SALT Petrobras was created by Law No. 2,004, dated 3 October 1953, and it was endowed with the monopoly of the activities of oil exploration and production. Only from 1997 other foreign or national companies start participating in oil production and research in Brazil. Despite being a state-owned company, Petrobras has 60% of its joint stock held by private investors. In its Business Plan for the 2009-2013 period, Petrobras announced that US$ 104 billion will be invested in the exploration and development of areas already bid for. In this period, US$ 28 billion will be invested in Pre-salt areas. Petrobras’ total investments will be RS$ 174.4 billion in the next five years. Production Petrobras estimates that in 2013 the province of Pre-salt will already be producing 219,000 barrels of oil a day. In 2020, the company and its partners may be producing 1.8 million barrels a day in the Pre-salt. In the development for Pre-salt production alone, the state-owned company foresees investing US$ 111 billion from 2009 to 2020. Today, Petrobras’ production is roughly 2.7 million barrels of oil a day, adding up the oil and natural gas production in Brazil and abroad. In 2010, Petrobras estimates its total production will be roughly 5.7 million barrels of oil equivalent a day. Within 12 years, the company will more than double its production (Azevedo, 2009).

Investments Even without mentioning Pre-salt areas not bid for yet, Petrobras has already to face huge investments to be made in the future. These investments will be funded by the company itself and by third parties. The Brazilian National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES) will be an important source of resources for Petrobras investments in both the production and refining of Pre-salt oil. On 30 July 2009, the BNDES and Petrobras signed a loan contract worth R$ 25 billion. This was the biggest financing operation ever undertaken by the BNDES. It was also a pioneering operation because of its financial characteristics. It involves the first bank loan to be paid with government bonds. To achieve this, the BNDES raised R$ 25 billion from the National Treasury in government bonds, which will be transfered to companies in the Petrobras group.

To guarantee the success of the current business plan of Petrobras concerning both exploration of areas already granted and expansion of the refinery complex, all possible forms of aid should be sought from the government, even if that implies an increase in federal public debt. However, the exploration of areas not already bid for must be reconsidered, so that they should be source of revenue and not of expenses. Time is Money If Brazil does not explore the Pre-salt in the next four or five decades, it runs the risk of most of the recoverable oil from this province never being produced. The government revenues from exploration of the Pre-salt are urgently needed because Brazil is still fighting against problems such as extreme poverty, social inequality, and functional illiteracy. In the current framework of climate change it is likely that 50 years from now oil will lose its value because the planet is showing clear signs of the worsening of the greenhouse effect. Furthermore, new technologies are being developed. The energy model for the goods and personal transport sector, based on trucks and cars powered by oil by-products, may change in the coming decades.

If Brazil, in fact, opts for a minimum participation of 30% in Petrobras in all the Pre-salt areas not yet bid for, the rate of exploration could be limited by the firm’s ability to invest, which can mean a slower increase in the potential revenue of the state. According to carmakers, in 2025, 30% of new cars could be electric. If the USA and Europe invest heavily in new technologies, the importance of oil in the industry could be reduced. Thus, under the State’s strictest control, international companies should be encouraged, so that the rate of exploration of the Brazilian Pre-salt may be speeded up, and different ideas and concepts applied. We know that the capital and technology for oil exploration of such companies are being attracted by countries such as Angola and Norway. NEW LEGAL FRAMEWORK Such situations indicate that a new legal framework should be created, in which oil and natural gas can be explored directly by the Union, allowing services to be contracted for either with concession contracts or production-sharing contracts. In this new context arising from discoveries that have been made in the province of Pre-salt, the current model of oil research and production, as set out in Law No. 9.478/1997, needs to be reviewed. Nowadays, the concession model is the only instrument for prospecting for and producing oil and natural gas in Brazil. The current Law limits the exercise of a constitutional monopoly, as stated in Article No. 177 of the Federal Constitution because it obliges the Union to sign concession contracts in order to prospect for and produce oil or natural gas in Brazil. Thus, Law No. 9.478/1997 needs to be made flexible enough to allow the Union to draw up service contracts and, mainly, production-sharing contracts, which are very suitable for developing countries that have large reserves and where the exploration risk is low, as in the province of Pre-salt.

Sharing contracts The main advantage of sharing contracts as opposed to service contracts is the fact that all investments and all risks are the responsibility of the oil company, and not of the State. Thus, oil exploration is just source of revenue, not representing any expense for the State. In the production-sharing contract, the Union enters into contracts with private or state-owned companies to carry out research and production activities. These companies and the Union share profits by means of the hydrocarbons produced or their monetary value. In contracting services, Petrobras itself would be able to carry out activities related to research into and the production of oil and natural gas, being paid by the Union for the work done. Individualization of production Another shortcoming of Law No. 9.478/ is that it does not address the individualization of the oil production of fields that extend from licensed to unlicensed blocks. The Union, as holder of rights and duties of unlicensed blocks, has to be a party to agreements of individualization in blocks that extend beyond the areas already licensed. In this case, the new legal framework should foresee this kind of agreement among the Union and holders of rights and duties in the licensed area. These agreements and the production-sharing contracts can speed up the rate of Pre-salt production. If Brazil does not explore this new oil province in the next four or five decades, it runs the risk that most of the recoverable oil in the Pre-salt area will stay there for ever. Text summarized from the white paper “The Pre-salt and the new legal framework,” by Legislative Adviser Paulo César Ribeiro Lima, from Area XII (Mineral, Water, and Energy Resources), from Legislative Consulting Services of the Chamber of Deputies.